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ABSTRACT
A number of high profile product safety events and recalls have heightened public
attention to the safety and security of the products that people consume and use. While
product safety isn’t a new topic, the effect of the global supply chain in creating or
exacerbating safety risks and vulnerabilities is both timely and relevant. In this essay we
focus on how the field of operations management can provide fresh perspectives and
insights in addressing the challenges of product safety and security in the global supply
chain. We first examine the product safety issues and challenges that arise in five
industries that are increasingly globalizing their supply chains: food, pharmaceuticals,
medical devices, consumer products and automobiles. We describe four areas where
operations management theory and methodologies can provide fresh insights and
innovative solutions in addressing these problems; regulation and standards, product
lifecycle management, traceability and recall management, and supplier relationships.
1. Introduction
A series of high profile product recalls in recent years has shaken public confidence in the
ability of manufacturers and governments to assure the safety of food and other products
used by consumers (Gallup, 2008). In the past, product failures were often attributed to
local or functional errors in product design, the manufacturing process, or inadequate
labeling with limited impact. Today a single product safety problem can have significant
repercussions on a global scale (Marucheck, 1987). For example, recent recalls by Toyota in
2009 and 2010 not only incurred huge litigation fees, but also resulted in estimated losses in
the billions of dollars due to lost sales, reduced manufacturing output, and enhanced incentive
campaigns. The effects of this recall were felt not only in the U.S., but also around the world in
the many countries where Toyota has a market presence (Sanchanta and Takahasi, 2010). For
a wide range of products from food and drugs to consumer products, medical devices and
automobiles, product safety problems are magnified in terms of scope and scale within
today’s global economy. Globalization of most industries has sparked heightened
awareness of the various risks and vulnerabilities that products are exposed to as they
move along the supply chain continuum from design and sourcing to manufacture,
transportation, distribution and final sale to the consumer. Supply networks are long and
complex. Many entities including outsourcers and subcontractors located in emerging
economies such as China handle the product as it moves across geographical and national
borders, thereby creating many physical and temporal threats that pose a risk to product
safety and security. Lee et al. (2008) address product recalls from the perspective of the
supply chain, particularly in China, highlighting the challenges that companies face in a highly
globalized business environment, including the importance of relationships and the impact of
cultural misunderstandings.
The topic of product safety and security is an emerging area within the domain of supply
chain risk management, and it has received increased academic attention during the last
decade (Lee and Whang, 2005; Pyke and Tang, 2010; Tang, 2008; Wein and Liu, 2005). In
characterizing supply chain risk as a disruption or negative outcome triggered by
unpredictable and/or uncertain events, Narasimhan and Talluri (2009) used a food safety
accident to illustrate how risk may be manifested throughout a global supply chain.
Although the number of papers addressing risk management within a supply chain
continues to grow, there is currently no universally accepted classification of the different
types of risks experienced within supply chain although Chopra and Sodhi (2004),
Hendricks and Singhal (2003, 2005), Tang (2006) and Wagner and Bode (2006), among
others, offer various classifications and typologies. Most of these risk categories address
events that may precipitate negative consequences with respect to the flow of product
through the supply chain. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of these
classifications address the effects of undesirable events on the integrity of the product. We
are concerned with the risk to a product – particularly with respect to its composition, ability
to perform its intended use, and adequacy of its packaging and labelling – when the
outcome of some deviation could result in the compromised health or safety of users or of
other people, property or equipment who may be in proximity of its use.
Product safety refers to the reduction in the probability that use of a product will result in
illness, injury, death or negative consequences to people, property or equipment. We
broadly define use to mean that the product may be consumed, physically implanted into
the body, or placed into physical use. While some safety issues can be traced back to design
flaws, manufacturing or processing defects, software problems, and packaging errors (or a
combination of these), a supply chain perspective highlights the safety problems that can
arise at transfers in the system from improper storage, handling and distribution of the
product (Thirumalai and Sinha, 2011). For example, the source of a particularly virulent
Escherichia coli contamination of hamburger meat in 2007, which resulted in serious
illnesses for several consumers, was never identified (Moss, 2009). A follow-up investigation
revealed that the contamination could have arisen at any step of the supply chain, starting
from the slaughter house operations of several different suppliers, one located in Uruguay, to
final grinding of the meat prior to packaging located in Wisconsin. The sanitary conditions in
the work environment were also suspect, as well. Managing product safety involves adopting
proactive and reactive strategies to minimize the likelihood of delivery an unsafe or ineffective
product and to avoid costly recalls.
Product security refers to the delivery of a product that is uncompromised by intentional
contamination, damage, or diversion within the supply chain. Security problems can result
from the actions of a third party that either disrupt the supply chain in order to destroy
assets, as in the case of terrorist attack, or alter and misrepresent an individual product
for economic gain, as in the case of counterfeiting (Sarathy, 2006). Since 2001, there has
been increased attention towards developing strategies to safeguard the product supply
chain against security breaches in order to avoid losses to human health and well-being,
infrastructure, and supply chain assets. These approaches often involve strategies to reduce
overall losses by identifying likely sources of threat and taking action to prevent or reduce
the potential damage posed by that threat. Our focus herein is on security problems that
compromise the product, resulting in the delivery of a product which is unsafe or ineffective.
These problems would include deliberate substitution of materials/components,
contamination or adulteration of a product, or misrepresenting a counterfeit product as
authentic through counterfeited labeling, packaging or instructions. While any of these
actions can lead to an unsafe or harmful product, they may also lead to a product that is
ineffective. In the case of medical diagnostics, a compromised or counterfeit testing device
may fail to accurately diagnose a medical condition, causing an error in the prescribed
treatment and possible deterioration in the overall health of a patient. Thus, while the
patient suffers no harm at the time of use, a counterfeit product can result in a delay in
proper treatment, ineffective treatment, or incorrect treatment, any of which could
endanger the health of a patient.
In this essay, we focus on five industries where product safety and security is most
critical: food, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, consumer products and automobiles. Each of
these industries has and continues to experience a growing number of product recalls that has
caused product safety and security to emerge as a critical concern within the industry. Each
of these industries shares two other important similarities. First, each industry has globalized
with much sourcing of components and ingredients from low-cost global suppliers, increased
outsourcing of production to foreign production facilities, and transportation and distribution
within global markets. In each of these industries, recent safety problems can be traced back
to changes in global supply chain systems. Second, each industry produces products which
meet ‘critical needs as defined by Nagurney et al. (2011). Specifically, all of these products,
particularly food, pharmaceutical and medical devices, are necessary to sustain and prolong
human life and well-being. Automobiles and consumer products, which include toys,
electronics and household items, while not necessary to sustain human life, have certainly
contributed to the quality of life and improved living standards enjoyed by much of the
population. Problems with the safety or effectiveness of all of these products, no matter
what the source of risk, have led to health problems, injury and even death.
2. Interface between operations management and product safety and security
Although product safety has traditionally been viewed as a technical problem in the domain
of regulators, epidemiologists, design engineers, scientists, as well as quality management,
safety engineering and ergonomics, there has been growing awareness that operations
management can provide fresh and effective approaches to managing product safety and
security. Lewis (2003) coined the term operational risk, which he defined as the potential
for an operation to generate negative consequences for various external and internal
stakeholders. Using case studies to investigate a theoretical model that integrated theories
of operations management with risk management, he concluded that effective risk control is
more similar to service quality management than process control. He advocated a risk control
process that incorporates dimensions of prevention, mitigation and recovery.
Others later adapted risk management theory to address supply chain disruption. Using
basic concepts of risk management where (1) sources of risk are identified; (2) potential
consequences of those risks are assessed, and (3) the appropriate actions are determined to
mitigate risk, Chopra and Sodhi’s (2004) approach to supply chain risk involved stress testing
to identify specific risks and tailoring strategies to adapt a risk mitigation approach for each
specific risk. Kleindorfer and Saad (2005) used operations principles, such as supply chain
optimization, supply chain agility, contingency planning, collaborative sharing of information
in the supply chain, flexibility and modularity, and total quality management (TQM), among
others, as the building blocks to effectively manage disruptive risk in a supply chain. While
not a comprehensive list, others who use operations management principles to address
issues of product security and safety include Lee and Whang (2005) who advocate the use of
total quality management, Crosby’s cost of quality paradigm and Six Sigma’s Design Measure
Analyze Improve Control (DMAIC) in order to design and operate better processes to assure
supply chain security at lower cost. Kumar and Schmitz (2011) also use Six Sigma in the
management of recalls. Tang (2008) and Pyke and Tang (2010) use continuous improvement
as a foundation to their 3R approach (e.g. readiness, responsiveness, and recovery) in
managing product safety and handling recalls.
Using an integrated operations management/risk management approach, we next describe
the product safety and security risks in each of our five industries. We also discuss
strategies to prevent and mitigate potential risks in these industries. While it is impossible to
eliminate all hazards from ever reaching the market, we then discuss critical strategies and
research directions for detecting and responding to safety and security failures. Many of
these are relevant to the operations management literature.
3. Product safety and security in critical industries
Below we provide a brief description of product safety and security issues in five different
industries – food, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, consumer products and automobiles.
3.1. Food safety and security
Unsurprisingly, the safety of food products has been a topic of debate for centuries. The first
known law pertaining to the purity of food products, known as the “German Beer Purity Law” or
Reinheitsgebot, dates as far back as 1516 (Dornbusch, 1997). Today we have a myriad of
laws, regulations, standards, processes, tools and technologies intended to ensure food safety.
Nevertheless, food safety scandals still occur on an all too regular basis. Table 1 presents
some high profile food safety incidents that have occurred in several countries.
From a safety perspective, food supply chains have a number of vulnerabilities (Whipple et
al., 2009). First, they deal with natural products, many of which are perishable and could
become harmful to consumers if not managed in a timely and safe manner (Akkerman et
al., 2010). Secondly, food supply chains tend to be long, global and highly interconnected,
leading to greater risk exposure (Henson and Reardon, 2005; Roth et al., 2008; Trienekens
and Zuurbier, 2008; Whipple et al., 2009). Third, food and beverage products are at risk of
intentional or unintentional adulteration and could even be the target of terrorist threats
(Wein and Liu, 2005; Whipple et al., 2009). According to Harl (2002), among seven general
areas of vulnerability to terrorism in the US, five are related to the food supply chain. Careful
management across the entire supply chain is necessary to ensure that products reaching
the final consumer are safe to eat and drink.
Research by Voss et al. (2009) explores the tradeoffs among price, delivery, quality and
safety in selecting suppliers in the food supply chains of the U.S. Their research concludes
that, in general, safety considerations tend to be less important in selecting suppliers when
compared to quality, delivery and price. They argue that this lower priority could be a
factor behind the frequency of food safety incidents. However, their results also indicate
that safety is more important under certain circumstances, particularly when products are
sourced from abroad. Failures in food safety can have serious negative consequences not
only for consumers, but also for the companies involved. The worst case scenario occurs
when incidents lead to deaths or illness (Trienekens and Zuurbier, 2008). According to
Thomsen and McKenzie (2001) millions of people around the world become ill every year as a
result of unsafe foods. It has been estimated that in the U.S. alone, foodborne pathogens
account for 76 million illnesses and 5000 deaths (Mead et al., 1999). Thomsen and
McKenzie (2001) argue that human error and the limitations of food safety technology
mean that, from time to time, consumers will face food safety risks. High profile incidents
such as the Salmonella outbreak caused by peanut butter paste sold by the Peanut
Corporation of America in 2008 (Layton and Miroff, 2009), or the adulteration of powdered
milk with melamine in China in the same year (Spencer, 2009), have made the headlines
due to their scale and severity. In both cases the consequences for those involved have been
serious. The Peanut Corporation of America filed for bankruptcy in February 2009 (Layton and
Miroff, 2009). In the Chinese case, Sanlu, the company responsible, has been closed down,
the general manager and a number of company officials are in jail, and two have been
sentenced to death (Spencer, 2009).
Most food safety incidents do not lead to death or illness, and in many cases products can
be recalled before they reach the consumer. However, recalls can be complex and costly
(Thomsen and McKenzie, 2001; Whipple et al., 2009), they can damage a firm’s reputation
(Hornibrook et al., 2005; Thomsen and McKenzie, 2001; Whipple et al., 2009), and ultimately
affect the consumers’ perception of an entire product category (Henson and Reardon, 2005;
Trienekens and Zuurbier, 2008). All of these factors can contribute to shareholder losses. A
study by Thomsen and McKenzie (2001) uses event analysis to evaluate the impact of
product recalls on shareholder loses. They conclude that in cases where the product recalled
poses a serious threat to consumers’ health, there is a loss in shareholder wealth of between
1.5% and 3%. However, they also conclude that recalls involving less serious infringements
have no negative impact on shareholder wealth.
3.2. Pharmaceutical safety and security
Since the 1982 Tylenol deaths, public attention has been awakened to the vulnerability of
pharmaceuticals in the supply chain. Pharmaceuticals are chemical substances used to
diagnose, cure, treat or prevent disease or adverse medical conditions. They are among the
most highly regulated of all products with many nations enforcing strict regulations on the
marketing and sale of drugs. Since they are metabolized in the body, pharmaceuticals are
subject to many of the same regulations found in the food industry. However, since a drug
must be proven safe and effective in fulfilling its intended medical purpose, the approval
process contains additional controls such as medical and scientific review, as well as clinical
patient trials, to empirically test its effectiveness within the population. In medicine and the
life sciences, drug safety means efficacy of the treatment, the absence of serious side effects,
and the minimization of any interactions with other drugs that the patient may be taking. In
this essay, we don’t focus on these safety problems but, instead, consider safety and security
problems that may occur in the supply chain. Specifically, we look at three problems: (1) con-
tamination and substitution of both active and inactive ingredients within the global supply
chain; (2) counterfeiting of drugs; and (3) the rise of secondary distributors. All of these
problems have the potential to introduce patient safety risks into the supply chain and create
costly liability, recalls and losses for the brand manufacturer. Several recent illustrations of
these types of problems are presented in Table 2.
One trend in the pharmaceutical industry has been the global sourcing of both active and
inactive ingredients from emerging economies where costs are lower. Further, the
manufacture of generic drugs or those coming off patent are also more likely to be outsourced
to manufacturers in developing countries. For example, in the last decade the value of
India’s production of both active ingredients and finished formulations for export has doubled
(Grackin, 2008). The long supply chain, with sourcing, manufacturing, packaging and
distribution occurring in different locations globally, has increased the risks of contamination or
substitution of alternative ingredients, as in the case of the 2008 heparin accident (Blum,
2008).
Risk control through FDA regulation and inspections may be ineffective in detecting all the
risks that can occur at each point in a multitier supply chain, particularly when the
contamination is intentional or when there is fraudulent certification that the product has
met all regulations and passed inspection (Tang, 2008). Grackin (2008) argues that risk
prevention may be better served by using a total sourcing model, rather than the cost-
based models that are commonly used in sourcing decisions. She argues that a more
comprehensive sourcing model would also consider the costs of risk management should the
product be contaminated or adulterated. The high costs associated with supply disruption,
product liability and recall might indicate that some low-cost suppliers are really high-cost
suppliers when the expected costs of safety risk are factored in.
The second problem, counterfeiting, is subtly different from contamination since it refers to
the intentional and fraudulent production of drugs for economic gain. In 2009,
approximately 8.3 million doses of counterfeit pharmaceuticals were seized, and this
amount was regarded as the tip of the iceberg of a growing problem in which counterfeiters
seek to exploit the high cost of pharmaceuticals by offering them at lower prices (Jackson,
2009). In order to keep costs down, counterfeiters may use none or incorrect amounts of the
active ingredient and then lace the drug with impurities or harmful substances. The risk to
the patient may be harmful side effects or no treatment at all. In other words, the patient
may think he/she is taking a drug to correct a health problem. However, since the
counterfeit drug might lack correct concentrations of active ingredients, it may be akin to
taking no drug at all. More than just a safety problem, some worry that counterfeit drugs
could become a national security problem if terrorists are able to introduce counterfeit
drugs into the supply chain (Health Industry Group Purchasing Association, 2004; Lawson,
2009).
Table 1 - Selected high profile food safety incidents.
Year Incident Description Company
2011 E. coli
contamination of
bean sprouts
As of this printing, an outbreak of a rare form of E.
coli killed 37 people and sickened more than 3000
in Europe. European Union approved 210 million euros
($286.78 million) in emergency aid for vegetable
farmers affected by the crisis.
Sprout farm in northern
Germany near Hamburg
2008–2009 Salmonella
outbreak in
peanut butter
paste
Contaminated peanut butter paste is linked to nine
deaths and 637 cases of Salmonellosis in the U.S. and
Canada with thousands more illnesses suspected. The
incident triggered the largest product recall in U.S.
history affecting nearly 4000 products (Layton and
Miroff, 2009).
Peanut Corporation of
America
2008 Dioxin in Irish
pork dioxin
Large international recall of Irish pork products due to
contamination with dioxin. Pork supplies to a total of
23 countries was affected, 13 within the European
Union (EFSA, 2008; Hornibrook et al., 2005).
Millstream Power
Recycling Limited
2008 Melamine in
Chinese milk
products,
including milk
powder
Contamination of milk and infant formula, as well as
other milk-based products due to adulteration with
melamine. An estimated 300,000 illnesses were
reported and six infants died (Roth et al., 2008).
Chinese milk producers
Sanlu Mengniu, Yili,
and Yashili
1986–1987 Mad cow disease Epidemic of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE)
or “Mad Cow” disease in U.K. was suspected to be the
cause of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) which
affected hundreds of people (Colchester and
Colchester, 2005).
Multiple producers in
U.K.
1858 Arsenic poisoning
in sweets
An accidental contamination of sweets with
arsenic poisoned more than 200 people and
resulted in about 20 deaths. This incident led to
the passage of the Pharmacy Act 1868 in the UK
and legislation regulating the adulteration of
foodstuffs (Sheeran, 1992).
Bradford, England
Sources of the problem are very much related to changes in the supply chain. They
include internet pharmacies and sellers, often located in other countries, that distribute and
sell counterfeit drugs. As discussed above, with much manufacturing outsourced, there are a
number of unscrupulous manufacturers, many located in India, China and Southeast Asia,
who will produce the counterfeit drugs and package them so they look authentic. Group
purchasing organizations (GPOs) seeking lower costs for volume purchases may fall prey to
counterfeiters and bring them into hospitals and other health care organizations. Another
source of counterfeiting includes hackers who breach the proprietary data of pharmaceutical
corporations to steal formulas and logistics strategies. Finally, well-publicized shortages of
drugs, like vaccines, may cause legitimate health care organizations to seek alternatives to
name brand products and unintentionally procure counterfeit drugs (Grackin, 2008; Lawson,
2009).
Current approaches to combat counterfeiting are adopted from methods used to track
inventory through the supply chain. Some states already require each drug to have a unique
electronic pedigree which can be used to track the drug through the supply chain and which
can identify the path of the drug from manufacture to distribution and retail. The
ePedigree coupled with the use of smart devices, such as strategically placed sensors and
RFID readers throughout the supply chain, is currently viewed as possibly the most effective
means of combating counterfeiting (Health Industry Group Purchasing Association, 2004;
Lawson, 2009).
Table 2 - Selected high profile pharmaceutical safety incidents.
Year Product Problem description Manufacturer
Ongoing Viagra Pharmaceutical manufacturers in China and India have been involved
in the illegal manufacture and import of counterfeit Viagra into the
US. These illegal drugs often lack the active ingredient and may
include harm-ful ingredients as fillers. Results have included
hypoglycemia, stroke and even death. 57% of all counterfeit drugs
seized is Viagra (Jackson, 2009)
Pfizer
2009 Tylenol Reports of a musty, mildew-like odor associated with the analgesic
were believed to be the result of a chemical used to treat wood pallets
that transport and store packaging materials. The pallets were
believed to have originated in the Dominican Republic and were
then used to ship product from the manufacturing facility in Puerto
Rico into the U.S. The odor was associated with gastrointestinal upset.
A voluntary recall was issued (Rogers, 2009).
McNeil
2008 Heparin The active ingredient in heparin, which is derived from pig intestines
was contaminated with over-sulfated chondroitin after a virus
decimated Chinese pig herds. The contamination was blamed for 81
deaths and over 400 injuries, including allergic reactions. A recall was
issued in 2008 (Blum, 2008).
Baxter
The third problem of secondary distribution channels is also related to the growing
complexity of the supply chain. While not necessarily illegal, secondary distributors may
present some safety risks. Secondary distributors represent another supply path in an
already complex supply chain. They often purchase product from a source other than the
manufacturer, such as another distributor, and then sell the product directly to a health care
organization or a customer. Often when manufacturers offer discounts to meet sales targets
or to reduce their inventories, secondary distributors may begin to stockpile drugs and later
sell and divert them back into the primary distribution system. There are three possible
safety problems with the diversion (Health Industry Group Purchasing Association, 2004).
One is that secondary distributors may stockpile drugs that are near their expiration date
and then introduce them back into the supply chain at lower prices. Second, the distributors
may not have proper storage conditions for drugs which are sensitive to high temperatures
and, thus, compromise the safety and effectiveness of the drug. Third, the distributors
may stockpile critical drugs and, should the drug be in short supply, they will gouge the
market with inflated prices. The Health Industry Group Purchasing Association (2004) noted
that this was the case in the 2000 flu vaccine shortage where a dose sold at five times its
usual price. While there may be nothing illegal with this arbitrage behavior, it is certainly
unethical. It also leads to conditions where counterfeiters could easily enter the market and
infiltrate the primary supply chain by offering the critical drug at cheaper prices and in
abundant supply. Thus, some of the challenges associated with balancing supply with demand
in the pharmaceutical supply chain can be traced back to the influence of the secondary
distributors.
3.3. Medical device safety and security
Rapid technological developments in the medical products industry have created portfolios
of innovative and enhanced pharmaceutical products and medical devices that have helped
to improve human health and increase life expectancy. Panescu (2006) attributes
reported overall reductions in the rate of mortality and complications due to heart attacks,
stroke, diabetes and cancer reported between the years 1980 and 2000 to technological
advances in medical devices and diagnostics. Yet despite this progress, there is growing
concern regarding the safety of these devices as evidenced by a sample of some well-
publicized product failures illustrated in Table 3. These recalls range from the most serious
Class I recalls where the FDA has assessed a reasonable likelihood of serious death or injury
to voluntary recalls where the manufacturer has issued the recall in response to reports of
failure and safety risk from the field. A database of these and other recalls can be found on
the FDA’s website www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/RecallsCorrectionsRemovals.
In this section we focus on medical devices, a product category which consists of a broad
array of diagnostic and therapeutic medical products. Although medical devices include some
very simple products, such as gauze and bandages, the most sophisticated medical devices
are highly engineered products that increasingly integrate mechanical, electrical and software
systems to produce physical changes in the structure or function of the body. Since the
type and nature of safety risk can vary widely, depending on the device category, the FDA
recognizes three general classes of medical device based on the level of risk that they
present. Class I devices are regarded as lower risk products, and hence, subject to the least
control. These devices aren’t intended to support or sustain life and would include products
such as temperature monitors and hand-held surgical instruments. Class II devices, such as
infusion pumps and ultrasound sensors, may be subject to additional controls, such as
performance standards to ensure that they reliably operate at an effective level. Safety
problems could be created if these products malfunction or fail to perform reliably. Finally,
Class III devices are subject to the highest regulation because they often support and sustain
human life and pose serious risks to safety should they be found defective or fail to perform
reliably. Examples of Class III devices include sophisticated therapeutic products like
implantable cardioverter defibrillators (ICDs), pacemakers and vascular stents which are
implanted into the body, as well as diagnostic devices such as HIV test kits. Although errors
can occur during the design, manufacture, storage, transportation or use for any class of
device, it is usually accidents or failures associated with the Class III devices that receive
public attention. Note that other countries in Europe and Canada define these categories in
different ways so while the various typologies are similar, there is no uniform classification
system (Department of HHS FDA, 2009).
Like the pharmaceutical industry, the U.S. medical device industry has been the source
of a number of important medical innovations. With a market size of over $100 billion that is
fueled by millions of dollars of venture capital invested annually, the industry has
witnessed a rapid pace of technological development as evidenced by its high R&D
intensity and the thousands of patents issued each year (Chatterji, 2009). Yet this reliance
on innovation has, paradoxically, presented some safety risks. Three risks are discussed
below. One risk is balancing innovation with safety in the new product development
process. The second are the risks presented by an increasingly global supply chain. The third
is counterfeiting. As with pharmaceuticals, counterfeiting in the medical device industry
poses explicit risks to safety and security.
One problem for the industry has been a continual struggle to produce a constant stream of
innovative products that meet market demands and fuel revenue growth while still
complying with the FDA regulations for testing and review necessary for premarket approval.
Complaints that the regulatory approval process actually stifles innovation because it costs
too much and takes too much time in the developmental cycle are countered by statistics on
the high number of recalls in the medical device industry (McKinney, 2011). Yet the financial
consequences of a product recall may be less severe for the firms in the medical device
industry than in other industries. In an event study of product recalls in the medical device
industry, Thirumalai and Sinha (2011) found that at an aggregate level, financial market
penalties for a recall announcement weren’t statistically significant, regardless of the type of
recall. In explaining this surprising result, the authors posited that perhaps as technologies
are introduced and evolve, the market learns to expect recalls.
Table 3 - Several high profile medical device failures.
Year Product Description of problem Company
2011 Balloon
catheter
A design defect was discovered in the catheter whereby after
insertion, it could accidentally fracture or the bond could start
peeling. The retained fragments of the device could injure arteries
and result in death. Surgical intervention could be required to
remove the fragments. Although no injuries were reported, the
result was a Class I recall of less than 15,000 units in the U.S. and
about 3000 in other countries.
AngioScore
2011 Surgical graft
After facing 3000 lawsuits over problems with a hernia repair graft,
the company discovered several lots of surgical graft used in
repairing abdominal walls were contaminated with elevated
endotoxin levels. No injuries were reported, but there was a risk for
serious infection, septic shock, and death.
XenMatrix
2009 Infant
incubator
Although the product originally manufactured by Hill-Rom was
discontinued in 1998, Draeger later acquired Hill-Rom and
discontinued all product service and support in 2003. Yet the
incubator was still in use. In this accident the device overheated
and was responsible for a fire that injured an infant receiving
oxygen. The result was a voluntary recall of over 6000 units.
Draeger Medical
2008 Heart stent A design defect was discovered when the tip detached from the
delivery system while the stent was being threaded into place during
insertion. Result was increased procedure time, possible injury to
vessel walls, stroke or emergency surgery. Voluntary recall of about
2700 stents.
Boston Scientific
2007 ICD defibrillator The lead in the defibrillator was found to fracture which could cause
the device to issue unnecessary shocks or not operate at all.
Although 13 deaths and multiple injuries were blamed on the lead,
a voluntary recall was issued for 268,000 units.
Medtronic
Some safety hazards posed by complex new technologies may be difficult to anticipate
during development, and may not be realized until the device is actually in use (Maisel,
2005). Mojdehbakhsh et al. (1994) suggest there may be different phases in the life-cycle
of a device where different types of safety problems may arise. Like the other industries
we review, some problems occur prior to use. They may include errors, such as
contamination or inadequate sterilization, that might arise during manufacturing, packaging,
transportation, storage, and handling. Some risks might occur during implantation such as
the heart catheter whose tip detaches. Other problems may arise after implant and during
normal use when the patient is ambulatory, such as a pacemaker which becomes unreliable or
malfunctions. Cases where the device must be removed also present additional risks. Maisel
(2005) reported that more people were injured in the extraction of the ICD with a lead
failure than were injured by the failure itself. Singer (2010) reported that one of problems
associated with the Johnson & Johnson recall of its hip replacement implant was that its
high failure rate might require patients to undergo additional costly and painful surgeries to
remove the failed device and to replace it with another. Thus, anticipating all possible failures
in the lifecycle of a device can be difficult when the technology is new and still in
development.
A second problem is that the medical device industry, like others, is rapidly globalizing with
the volume of imported products and components growing by an average of 25% annually
over the period of 2001–2007. Likewise, the number of foreign Classes Iand II medical
device manufacturing facilities nearly doubled during this same time period with an
estimated 70% of medical device makers and pharmaceuticals engaged in manufacturing
arrangements with China (Department of HHS FDA, 2009; Rhea, 2007). Further, these
foreign companies are expanding their role in the medical device value chain. Not content
to just remain suppliers of components or contract manufacturers, several companies in
China are also developing technological expertise and are poised to become global innovation
leaders in design and development over the next decade (Barr, 2011). Although the FDA is
responsible for assuring the same quality standards are used for qualifying foreign
manufacturing facilities as those used in the U.S. safety and effectiveness of that medical
devices, the globalization of the industry makes this task more daunting (Tang, 2008).
All countries haven’t reached the same maturity in enforcing the same sets of standards or
regulations used by the FDA. For instance, prompted by a series of product failures, China
began a series of more comprehensive changes to their medical device regulation in 2008
(Yang, 2008). A key problem was harmonizing the various local standards used by provincial
regulatory bodies with new central level requirements. This was seen as a critical step before
attempting to conform to U.S. and European standards. As new devices are designed,
developed, manufactured and distributed all over the world, regulation and assurances of
product safety will become increasingly difficult to enforce.
The third source of safety problems is the growing rate at which counterfeit devices are sold for
economic gain. Increasing accessibility to technology that can be used to manufacture
devices and print labels means that counterfeiters can distribute products that are similar
to authentic products in every respect, including packaging, labeling, instructions and even
certification markings. Since the counterfeits are so realistic, health care providers may
inadvertently use them, not suspecting a problem until there is a malfunction or a patient
injury. The WHO estimated that 8% of the total medical device market is counterfeit. The
dangers of counterfeit products include safety risks to patients due to the use of inferior or
toxic materials as well as the economic risks to the genuine manufacturer who may face
legal liabilities, loss of revenue and harm to the product brand (Lancaster, 2010).
There are several reasons for the rise in counterfeiting. First, the high prices that medical
devices command make it economically lucrative for a third party manufacturer to produce
counterfeit products at lower costs, and then turn around and sell the products on the
Internet or through online auctions at lower prices than the true manufacturer could.
Second, the long and complex supply chains provide many opportunities for counterfeit
items to enter. Counterfeiting can occur at the component level or at the finished good level
and can reach the market through a distributor, wholesaler or even a retailer. Difficulties in
tracing the supply path, particularly as it passes through international trade zones, makes
counterfeiting a crime that is difficult to detect. One suggested solution is the adoption of
imaging and tracking technologies that have been used in inventory management.
Technologies such as barcoding, holograms, OCR and RFIDs can be used to capture
information about the product, verify its authenticity and monitor it through all stages of the
supply chain (Lancaster, 2010). Congress has authorized the FDA to establish a unique
device identification system (UDI) for medical devices that would uniquely identify the product
through distribution and use (Department of HHS FDA, 2009).
3.4. Consumer product and motor vehicle safety and security
Recently, less public attention has been directed towards the safety of consumer products
such as toys, electronics and household items relative to the attention that products such
as food and pharmaceuticals have received. Motor vehicles, however, have received
considerable attention lately due to a series of recent large recalls by Toyota and other car
manufacturers. In the United States, responsibility for the safety of consumer products,
with the exception of food, pharmaceuticals and automobiles, falls to the U.S. Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC) which regulates the sale and manufacture of more than
15,000 different consumer products. Authority for the CPSC is provided in the 2008 Consumer
Product Safety Improvement Act (Flaherty, 2008). This act was the result of a spike of 473
consumer products recalled in 2007 in what is referred to as the “Year of the Recall.”
Since 2011, CPSC has also maintained a public database of public complaints of safety
problems connected with any of the 15,000 kinds of consumer goods regulated by the CSPC
(www.saferproducts.gov). This database provides a growing and potentially rich database for
understanding trends in consumer product safety. Authority for European consumer product
safety is provided under the framework of the General Product Safety Directive. A rapid alert
system, RAPEX, allows for rapid exchange of information on dangerous consumer products
between the member countries and the European Commission, with the exception of food,
pharmaceutical and medical devices which are covered under other mechanisms. In the
U.S., the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is responsible for writing
and enforcing safety, theft-resistance, and fuel economy standards for motor vehicles.
NHTSA maintains the National Center for Statistics and Analysis database and the Fatality
Analysis Reporting System (FARS) which is a resource for traffic safety research throughout
the world. Table 4 below presents recent high profile consumer product and motor vehicle
safety events.
Table 4 - Selected high profile consumer product safety incidents.
Year Product Recall description Company
2008–2011 Automobiles Three separate recalls (floor mats,
accelerator pedal, and unrelated anti-lock
brake) of automobiles by Toyota Motor
Corporation after reports of unintended
acceleration. More than 9 million cars
recalled worldwide.
Toyota
2006–2011 Notebook
computer
batteries
More than four million notebook computer
batteries made by Sony were recalled after a
number of instances where the batteries
overheated or caught fire. Most of the
defective notebooks were sold in the U.S.
However, some one million faulty batteries
could still be in use elsewhere in the world.
Sony, Dell, Apple,
Toshiba, Hitachi, IBM,
among others
2011 Swimming pool
drain covers
The CPSC recalled more than 1 million
swimming pool drain covers currently
installed at thousands of public and private
pools across the country that can trap and
drown swimmers.
Eight U.S.
manufacturers of pool
drain covers
2010 Children’s toys Safety concerns caused the recall of more
than 11 million tricycles, toys and high chairs
due to safety hazards, as well as 100,000
toys due to a choking hazard.
Fischer Price/Mattel
2009 Roman and roller
window shades
More than 50 million roman and roller shades
were recalled due to a strangulation hazard
for children. Five children have died of
strangulation and 16 others have been nearly
strangled since 2006
Wal-Mart, JC Penney,
Pottery Barn, West
Elm, Ace Hardware,
Big Lots, Ross and The
Land of Nod
2006–2007 Children’s toys More than 20 million Chinese-made toys,
were recalled due to possible lead-paint
hazards for children and the use of strong
magnets that may detach and present a
swallowing hazard
Fischer Price/Mattel,
Mega Toys, and others
2006 Trucks Recall of nearly 8 million pick-up trucks and
14 other models built in 1988–1993 for a
short circuit in the ignition switch that could
lead to a fire in the steering column.
Ford
While problems with consumer product safety have continued to increase in recent years, little
academic research has directly addressed the operational and supply chain issues that lead to
unsafe products and recalls with the exception of Kumar and Schmitz (2011). In the 1980s and
early 1990s, consumer product safety research focused on manufacturing issues within the
factory including factors such as quality control and, to some extent, product design. Recently,
safety problems with consumer products can be traced to changes in global production
systems and the increasing complexity of global supply chains – especially supply chains that
cross emerging markets such as China. On the other hand, studies of the trends in automobile
recalls in the U.K. between 1992 and 2002 demonstrate enormous differences between car
manufacturers that are linked to geography. Specifically, European and American
manufacturers have recall rates that are nearly three times higher than those of manufacturers
in East Asia (Bates et al., 2007). Safety and security issues for consumer products can be
broadly attributed to three sources: (1) supply chain-related issues; (2) design-related issues;
and (3) manufacturing-related issues, described below.
As consumer product companies have shifted large segments of their production overseas, it
has been more difficult to maintain the safety of their products. This is especially true for
recent high profile recalls of products made in Asia. For example, in 2010, more than 90% of
toys were imported from Asia, especially China. The electronics industry is dominated by a few
global firms, but most all of them manufacture in low-wages countries in Asia. These devel
opments have placed a premium on the ability of governments to work together in partnership
to advance consumer product safety. In 2008, the European Union, U.S., and China launched a
trilateral approach to product safety designed to build mutual trust and develop a coordinated
response to product safety concerns, as well as keep to product safety at the top of the
international political agenda. International priorities include product traceability, convergence
of safety requirements, advice to manufacturers, and joint enforcement actions. The particular
challenges of maintaining product design quality and safety in international production
networks while, at the same time, trying to cut costs and shorten the concept-to-market time
have been addressed (Zhu et al., 2009, 2008). Many attribute the massive 2010 Toyota recall
to the overly rapid expansion of Toyota’s international production networks, and a focus on the
bottom line rather than on product quality and safety (Minhyung, 2010).
Another stream of research has attempted to understand which parts of the value chain are
most responsible for safety problems by distinguishing between design-related and
manufacturing-related recalls. Design defects include such causes as the use of small
detachable parts that pose a swallowing threat or engineering design defects that may cause
product overheating. Manufacturing defects include the use of parts contaminated by toxic
materials or manufacturing errors that lead to malfunction or explosion. Such problems would
include use of an inferior material instead of a specified material, poorly fitting parts and
improper assembly, or batteries that overheat. The use of lead paint would also be considered
a manufacturing-related safety problem since it was not part of the intended design. Research
by Chiang et al. (2001) examined the product design and manufacturing literature to
understand why consumer products of daily use fail to provide the intended function to users’
satisfaction. Other researchers have analyzed recall data available from the CSPC and found a
steady increase in recalls, and also that design problems have been responsible for the
majority of toy recalls (Hora et al., 2011). According to some authors, design-related recalls
are increasing faster proportionately, than manufacturing-related defects regardless of where
the manufacturing occurs, although there have been some challenges to this result (Bapuji and
Beamish, 2007; Bapuji et al., 2007; Dowlatshahi, 2000). For example, over the period 1988–
2007, the average annual number of distinct products recalled in the toy industry due to
design flaws was approximately 25 compared with only two that could be directly attributed to
manufacturing-related problems (Bapuji and Beamish, 2007).
As noted above, many of the defects that result in safety problems for consumer products can
be attributed to a lack of quality processes during product development, including engineering
and design (White and Pomponi, 2003). While a number of papers appeared in the late 1980s
and early 1990s addressing design issues and safety, many were published in the ergonomics
literature. Principles of ergonomics can contribute directly to the resolution of a product safety
problem. A methodology has been developed for applying ergonomic factors to the resolution
of safety issues concerning the design, manufacture and use of consumer products (Ramsey,
1985; Sagot et al., 2003). Several papers have investigated the root causes of accidents in
order to estimate the percentage of accidents that could be prevented or mitigated by changes
in design or the design process (Hale et al., 2007; Kinnersley and Roelen, 2007; Kirwan,
2007). Some authors have tried to present a coherent and systematic approach for considering
possible safety problems and how to avoid them (Fadier and Ciccotelli, 1999; Kjellen, 2002).
Others explored whether design processes that are successful in one industry can be
transferred to other industries (Drogout et al., 2007).
A variety of methodologies and systems have been suggested for integrating safety into the
design process (Fadier and De la Garza, 2006; Hasan et al., 2003). Some researchers have
addressed user-focused design methodologies, taking into account end-user characteristics,
interactions with work environment characteristics, and task cognitive requirements (Blaise et
al., 2003; De la Garza and Fadier, 2005; Fadier et al., 2003). Frameworks for implementing
user-focused design have also been developed (Fadier and De la Garza, 2006). Quality
function deployment, a tool adapted from operations management, has also been proposed as
an approach for considering multiple objectives, including safety, in establishing design
requirements (Karsak, 2004). A new concept, Prevention through Design, or PtD, has been
introduced as a national research initiative by the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health. Prevention through design is a risk mitigation strategy where hazards and risks are
virtually “designed out” of a product. Prevention by design was the topic of a 2008 workshop
that addressed a variety of issues from building the business case for PtD to the development
of PtD tools and processes, and methodologies for PtD research (Alston, 2008; Creaser, 2008;
Gambatese, 2008; Manuele, 2008; Schulte et al., 2008; Zarges and Giles, 2008). Finally,
some researchers have looked specifically at materials considerations in product design
(Karana et al., 2008).
Manufacturing-related problems that have the potential to impact human health have not been
reported as frequently for consumer products such electronics or toys as they have for other
products. As a result, manufacturing-related safety problems have not received as much
attention in the academic literature. Recently, however, as supply chain complexity has
increased, researchers are refocusing attention on manufacturing-related problems caused by
outsourcing the manufacturing task (Tang, 2008). Several safety problems with products
manufactured in developing regions of the world are linked to intentional actions by a supplier
or outsourcer to increase profits at the expense of safety. Other manufacturing-related safety
defects are largely unintentional problems in the specified manufacturing process that are not
recognized until the product is in the hands of the consumer. Safety issues related to
manufacturing defects are generally subsumed in larger quality issues which have been well-
studied. Recently, attention has been focused on the relationship between lean manufacturing
and increased levels of safety concerns. Lean manufacturing promises a low-cost, high-
efficiency production line but also brings a risk of quality control and safety issues. As product
lines become more technologically advanced, it is easier for problems to go unnoticed until
huge volumes have been shipped.
4. Challenges and directions for future research
The growing complexity of global supply chains related to off-shoring and outsourcing, coupled
with the constant development of new products, processes and technologies, have created
product safety and security challenges in the industries that we have just discussed. However,
these challenges are opening new avenues for operations management research in addressing
critical issues that impact product security and safety. From our review of the extant literature,
we have identified four key areas for further research that share commonality and criticality
across all of the product groups we investigated: (1) collaborating with governments in
developing new regulatory mechanisms and standards that incentivize safety; (2) better tools
and methodologies for managing information during the lifecycle of the product from design
through disposal; (3) technologies for tracing products across the global supply chain and
managing recalls; and (4) building supplier relationships as a critical element of a product
safety risk management strategy.
4.1. Regulation and standards
Any risk management strategy for assuring product safety throughout the supply chain must
address incentives (or disincentives) for firms in implementing policies, processes, and
practices that promote the safety of products. Governments, international organizations and
industry associations are seldom considered as collaborators in supply chain safety, but
partnerships between business and government agencies will be required to improve safety
and security in the supply chain (Sarathy, 2006). While the terms “regulation” and “standards”
are often used interchangeably, there are some differences. Regulations establish government
agencies, such as the U.S. Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC), the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA)
with the responsibility for performing critical duties, such as approving products as safe and
effective prior to entering the market, inspecting manufacturing facilities, and pursuing recalls.
These agencies assure that firms meet basic rules for safety, and they also possess the
authority to impose sanctions or fines when they discover violations or non-compliance.
Standards are established norms or codified requirements for a product, such as material
specifications or technical standards for performance. Standards may be developed by
regulatory agencies, public organizations or industry associations. Many industry standards are
voluntary meaning that compliance is expected and supervised by independent boards, but
there are no legal sanctions for non-compliance. The most common of the public standards are
those promoted by the International Standards Organization (ISO), most notably the ISO
9000(1) series of quality standards which are industry independent, and the ISO 22,000
standard which focuses specifically on the management of safety across supply chains (Luning
et al., 2006; Trienekens and Zuurbier, 2008). Compliance with FDA’s Good Manufacturing
Practice (GMP) is a requirement for manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, medical devices
(Classes II and III) and food. While different GMP guidelines are used by the World Health
Organization (WHO), the European Union, Canada and many other countries, the basic
concepts are similar (Aruoma, 2006; Trienekens and Zuurbier, 2008). According to many
guidelines, compliance with GMP means that the manufacturer must effectively meet ISO 9000
standards in assuring that an adequate quality system is in place to assure that proper
production and testing processes are in place for producing quality products (ERG, 2006).
The benefits of standards are controversial with some arguing that they promote better
product quality and signal good management while others argue that some firms are
minimalists and will do only what is necessary to meet standards. Numerous studies of the
benefits of ISO 9000 have been inconclusive and only intensified the debate about the
effectiveness of standards (Anderson et al., 1999; Corbett et al., 2005; Sroufe and Curkovic,
2008; Terziovski et al., 1997). In discussing private standards for food safety, Trienekens and
Zuurbier (2008) argue the benefits of such standards in serving four purposes: (1) to improve
suppliers’ standards and avoid product failure; (2) to eliminate multiple audits across the
supply chain; (3) to transfer specific demands to parties upstream in the chain; and (4) to
provide traceability in cases of food incidents. Henson and Reardon (2005) argue that, in
addition to ensuring traceability and safety, private standards can also be used as a form of
differentiation, becoming a “major competitive instrument”. However, others argue that
standards are nothing more than a tariff because the cost of implementation and accreditation
is a major barrier, particularly for small companies or for those based in developing countries
with limited access to resources (Trienekens and Zuurbier, 2008). For example, Liu (2004)
argues that many local manufacturers in China fail to meet established GMP standards, but
they do have lower cost structures and other capabilities that could make them good
candidates for outsourcing and contract manufacturing of Class I medical devices.
Another major international challenge, given the complexity of global supply chains, has been
the harmonization of standards and regulations both within countries and across countries to
ensure that safety management practices are applied consistently across the supply chain
(Aruoma, 2006; Department of HHS FDA, 2009). On one hand, harmonized standards and
regulations would lead to decreased bureaucracy for companies that wish to meet safety
requirements and be able to market their products in different countries. But this may not be
easy, as often standards must be first harmonized internally within a country. China found that
just harmonizing regulations across different provinces, as well as across different government
agencies, delayed the globalization of its medical device industry (Yang, 2008).
Further, the proliferation of standards and the bureaucratic burden imposed on suppliers can
make find it difficult to comply (Trienekens and Zuurbier, 2008). As manufactured products
become technically more complex, there are an increasing number of standards addressing
different systems embodied in the product that must be considered. For example, the ICS
11.100 and 11.040 standards specify ISO requirements for medical devices. However, many
devices also use electrical and software systems. IEC 60,601 standards provide the
requirements for medical electrical equipment while IEC 62,304 specifies standards for medical
software. ISO 13,845 represents the requirements for the design and manufacture of medical
devices (Higson, 2002). This example illustrates that different standards might address
different systems or modules of a single product. McKinney (2011) argues that this
proliferation of standards coupled with FDA requirements for market approval can slow down
the pace of innovation in the medical device industry, thus creating economic losses for the
industry as well as societal losses.
While regulation and standards are needed, there are questions as to whether this approach
provides effective incentives for ensuring product safety in the supply chain. One stream of
research addresses the impact of tort liability in the U.S. and Europe on product and process
design. It questions the assumption that fear of tort liability influences companies to
emphasize safety and minimize risk in designing or developing a new product (Baram, 2007).
The 1976 Medical Device Amendment provides that, unlike drugs, a medical device
manufacturer couldn’t be sued in state court by patients alleging injury due design defect or
failure to warn if the device had received marketing approval from the FDA. This was the basis
for the dismissal of 1000 cases involving an ICD lead which was recalled from the market in
2009 (Curfman et al., 2009). Thus, many question the effectiveness of tort liability alone in
ensuring safe products.
Questions also arise as to whether regulations will be sufficient to address potential safety
issues relating to current and future products that derive from new technologies or industries
(e.g. biotechnology or genetically modified products). Thus, there has been limited research
recently on new approaches such as co-regulation and taxation that could be more effective
(Magat and Viscusi, 1992; Magat and Moore, 1996). Earlier work by Johnson (1982) addressed
cost-benefit analysis and the optimal level of consumer product safety, including voluntary
standards. Further, while the use of standards and regulations is accepted practice in the
developed world, as globalization moves the base of manufacturing in developing countries,
studies have looked at the impact of safety standards on the start-up and production costs for
small and medium-sized firms. Research has suggested that policy solutions might focus on
subsidies or public support programs that offset the cost disadvantage that arises (Maskus et
al., 2005). Further work is needed in the interface of operations and policy to determine the
most effective incentives for ensuring product quality and safety in the supply chain.
4.2. Product lifecycle management
Product lifecycle management refers to the process of managing the entire lifecycle of a
product from conception through design and manufacturing, including service and disposal. As
a risk prevention tool, one key challenge with lifecycle management is to manage all data
relating to the design, production, support and ultimate disposal of manufactured goods so as
to improve the safety and quality of the product. The expression of this task varies depending
on product type. Some approaches are process-based. For example, managing food safety
risks across the supply chain requires documented policies and procedures that describe how
to deal with the product throughout its lifecycle (Creedle, 2007). One of the most common
tools serving this purpose for food products is Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points
(HACCP) (Akkerman et al., 2010; Aruoma, 2006; Creedle, 2007; Henson and Reardon, 2005;
Trienekens and Zuurbier, 2008). HACCP was originally developed by NASA and Pillsbury to
control the quality of food supplied to the manned space program. It is based on an adaptation
of the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) technique, an approach commonly used in
engineering applications. HACCP follows a systematic approach to identifying, evaluating and
controlling those steps in the process that are critical to food safety (Akkerman et al., 2010;
Sperber and Stier, 2009). HACCP is at the center of many safety assurance systems such as
the Codex Alimentarius, both EU and US food legislation, ISO 22,000 and most private
standards (HACCPEuropa, 2011; Trienekens and Zuurbier, 2008).
A related tool for safety analysis used in the management of the lifecycle in medical devices is
hazard analysis. The process starts with a preliminary hazard analysis that is intended to
identify the scope and nature of hazards that might arise in critical design areas. Subsequent
analyses examine the hazards that may arise during storage, transportation or use; hazards
that arise due to technical malfunction or failure of the device; and hazards due to user error.
Anticipating these hazards and developing strategies to mitigate the risk they present is the
objective of hazard analysis (Higson, 2002). Mojdehbakhsh et al. (1994) describe another
approach which they call retrofitting safety. It is a lifecycle approach for software-controlled
medical device systems, which integrates process with traceability. The purpose of retrofitting
is demonstrating that existing and ongoing products are safe and conform to current standards
that may be stricter than those that were in effect when the product was originally developed.
The authors adopt a system-fault tree approach to explicitly identify safety faults and hazards
as well as their severity, both in the overall system and in the interfaces between the system
and software. In subsequent steps, they develop a process for eliminating safety faults
through improved design and final verification of the safety of the revised system. The fault
tree approach coupled with a hazard dictionary allows the developers to maintain traceability
between the system requirements, hazards and identified faults, critical operations, and
mitigation techniques. Thus, this approach integrates a process approach with explicit
traceability to create a database to support the safety of the product across its lifecycle.
For consumer products, new approaches for traceability of lifecycle information during
production include using knowledge-based tools to understand the complex relationships in
product structure. They include: (1) capturing information across the product lifecycle based
on a holonic definition of the product and its lifecycle (Terzi et al., 2007); (2) using graph
modeling for traceability of the flow of raw materials, parts, intermediates and subassemblies,
which are transformed into an end product (Jansen-Vullers et al., 2003); (3) using agent-
based information management models to manage information about complex products at the
component level (Framling et al., 2006); and (4) developing rule-based approaches to
automatically generate traceability relations between feature-based object oriented documents
(Jirapanthong and Zisman, 2009). For software products, recent laws such as Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 require organizations to implement change management processes with explicit
traceability coverage for any parts of a software product that potentially impact the balance
sheet. Best practices for implementing effective automated traceability for this purpose have
been explored (Cleland-Huang et al., 2007).
As safety becomes a recognized part of product lifecycle management, research will be needed
to determine if hazard analysis processes and/or traceability approaches lead to safer products
and fewer recalls. In designing a risk prevention strategy, are hazard analyses sufficient or do
they need to be integrated with traceability for maximum effectiveness? How do “smart”
traceability approaches using artificial intelligence and knowledge-based technologies perform
relative to more traditional approaches, and are they cost-effective? How can these
approaches be integrated with quality information systems?
4.3. Traceability and recalls
Large global recalls associated with recent product safety events, for example the Chinese
melamine-adulterated milk contamination in 2008, the adulterated heparin in 2008 and the
Toyota recall of 2011, have made the development of tools and technologies for traceability
through the supply chain a critical issue in risk control. For consumer products, traceability
studies have addressed access to the supplier network for more immediate recall of products
(Dai et al., 2010; Lee and Park, 2008). The ability to trace a food product as it travels through
different supply chains is useful for preventing consumers’ hazards and ultimately assuring the
quality and safety of foodstuffs (Rábade and Alfaro, 2006). However, with respect to medical
products, such as pharmaceuticals and medical devices, the ability to track and trace is critical
to detecting if a product is counterfeit while also deterring intentional contamination,
adulteration and diversion of legal products. This is an area where technology originally
developed for tracking inventory and assets in the supply chain has proven to be very useful.
Synergistic with the ability to track and trace is the development of an electronic pedigree
which can provide information about the route of a product at the package level through the
supply chain from manufacture to final use. Due to the special challenges in ensuring the
safety of the pharmaceutical supply chain, recent legislation is requiring that all
pharmaceuticals sold have an electronic pedigree or some unique product identification
(Grackin, 2008; Lawson, 2009). Congress has recently granted the FDA the authority to
establish a unique device identifier (UDI) system for medical devices. While not yet developed,
the UDI would identify the device through the supply chain and include other identifying
information (Department of HHS FDA, 2009). In addition, to providing authentication of the
product, these identifiers would provide critical information in the event of a recall. The
ultimate goal is to have complete transparency of documents, information, and goods across
borders. While many equate the use of the ePedigree with an RFID tag, Lawson (2009) points
out that it can be used with other optical technologies such as two dimensional bar coding and
optical character readers. RFIDs are already considered a supply chain technology, but many
consider them an inventory tracking tool that is used to address inaccurate inventory records.
The use of RFID for tracking and tracing is still in its infancy, but it has great potential as the
price of the tags declines and more companies adopt the technology (Alfaro and Rábade,
2009; Kumar and Putnam, 2008; Lee and Özer, 2007; Schmidt, 2008; Tang, 2008).
Traceability systems can bring additional benefits. For instance, Wang et al. (2010) have
developed an optimization model that uses traceability data in combination with operations
factors to develop an optimal production plan. Similarly, Rábade and Alfaro (2006) and Alfaro
and Rábade (2009), who investigated the implementation of traceability systems in Spanish
food supply chains, claim that companies involved in their studies recovered their investment
in less than 2 years and had significant improvements in supply, warehousing, inventory
management and production. Additional research is needed to establish the value of RFIDs in
traceability systems across industries. While they have a number of possible uses, do
ePedigrees and supply chain technologies actually reduce losses due to counterfeiting? Further
research might evaluate how effectively these systems can help to identify products which may
have been exposed to contamination or adulteration. Can they help in the event of a recall by
quickly identifying which items are actually at risk? Tang (2008) suggests that further safety
problems can occur when recalled products are sold on auction websites such as Ebay or
aftermarket channels instead of being disposed. Can these technologies help improve the
customer return rate and assure that recalled products aren’t resold?
Finally, in the area of recall management, there are several unresolved questions related to
risk discovery. They include identifying a product safety problem, mitigating the risk from a
recall, and learning from a recall. One of the critical issues in identifying safety problems is the
sharing of timely and accurate reporting of information regarding product reliability and
malfunctions. Maisel (2005) states there are no uniform standards for reporting and managing
advisories for Class III medical devices like pacemakers and ICDs. He argues that there is a
need for better reporting of confirmed cases of device malfunctions, and further, that
manufacturers should be required to publish detailed data on the reliability of their devices on
an annual basis. Yet he cautions that the observed failure rate will always be an underestimate
of the true failure rate because of underreporting and patient deaths that may have been
attributed to another cause.
Echoing this same argument, Tang (2008) states that many companies lack the type of timely
and complete information required to confidently make the decision to recall. However, he
notes that a delay in issuing a recall can lead to higher losses and risks more damage to the
firm’s reputation. Research is needed to determine how information sharing coupled with
“smart” IT solutions like data-mining techniques or pattern recognition methods can help in
detecting a safety problem and its likely root cause for purposes of making a timely recall
decision. However, companies may be wary of sharing information that they view as
proprietary and possibly damaging. The bottleneck may lie in having enough data and
information to use these sophisticated information technologies in managing recalls.
Operations management research that addresses information sharing in collaborative supplier
relationships may provide insights to how product safety information can be collaboratively
shared within an industry.
A second question is how to best mitigate the risks and losses associated with a recall.
Communication is a key element of an effective recall process (Dani and Deep, 2010). These
authors claim that speed of response is the most crucial variable to control the effects of risk.
This is also supported by Roth et al. (2008) who identify two relevant time constructs: the time
between discovery and reporting, and the time for recovery from disruptions. Furthermore,
Ren’s (2000) study on behavior in crisis situations indicates that their impact can be reduced
significantly if the response is prompt. Effective response involves the detection of a crisis, the
scoping of the problem, the identification of affected areas and the execution of the recall
management process (Kumar and Budin, 2006).
A third question relates to learning from recalls. This question is motivated by the work of
Thirumalai and Sinha (2011) who used an event study to demonstrate that the financial impact
of a recall, in terms of capital market impact, was insignificant in the medical device industry,
in contrast to studies in other industries that suggest strong financial penalties associated with
a recall. They observed a learning effect with recalls whereby the likelihood of a recall
decreased with the cumulative recall experience of a firm. However, the actual learning
mechanism is a topic for further research. The authors hypothesized that the firm could learn
from its own experiences and reduce the number of recalls over time by improving its product
designs, manufacturing processes, and even its risk management strategies. Another
possibility is vicarious learning. Since the medical device industry has a high number of recalls,
established firms in the industry have not only learned from their own experiences, but they
may learn from the experiences of others in the industry. Thus, how an organization learns in
the face of product safety problems and recalls is an open research question.
4.4. Supplier relationships
The final area that offers challenges for further research is the management of supply chain
relationships (Rábade and Alfaro, 2006; Alfaro and Rábade, 2009; Dani and Deep, 2010). As
companies have outsourced manufacturing to lower cost countries around the world, there has
been concern that pressures for lower costs, combined with the additional complexity of the
supply chain, will continue to lead to safety problems. An important issue is the relative
benefits of vertical integration versus outsourcing with respect to safety. Recent work by
Novak and Stern (2008) looks at the impact of vertical integration on the dynamics of
performance over the automotive product development lifecycle. One risk prevention strategy
would involve factoring product safety issues into the supplier selection decision. Grackin
(2008) argues that using a total sourcing model, rather than the traditional cost-based models,
may make sense for product safety. She argues that a more comprehensive sourcing model
would also consider the costs of risk management should the product be contaminated or
adulterated. The high costs associated with supply disruption, product liability and potential
recall might indicate that some low-cost suppliers are really high-cost suppliers when the
expected costs of safety risk are considered. Voss et al. (2009) also identify the role of supplier
selection in food safety as another potential area for research. In the automotive industry,
Park et al. (2011) explore whether quality management practices are different among
suppliers whose performance has been rated high, medium or low and which practices
contribute to the differences.
A second question is how to coordinate and monitor the behavior of suppliers with respect to
product safety. Tang (2008) points out that in the case of the Mattel toy recall, the company
had developed a certification program and rigorous testing rules to make sure that its Chinese
contractors adhered to standards for the allowable levels of lead in paint. Yet some
subcontractors were careless, while others intentionally violated the rules. While no risk control
system is perfect, research has focused on developing adequate control mechanisms within an
organizational to manage overseas suppliers and the adoption of effective supply chain
practices (Teagarden, 2009). Information technologies are increasingly being explored as tools
for better coordination and monitoring of the manufacturing process to avoid quality and safety
problems (Madhusudan, 2005). These technologies can provide real-time monitoring of
processes across a global supply chain that allows companies to manage supplier behavior,
especially suppliers located across the globe (Aron et al., 2008).
Companies must invest time and effort in developing not only standards and principles of
safety for their suppliers, but must also invest in education and training to build the skills and
abilities within the supplier network to assure product safety. A third question is how to
effectively educate suppliers. Jiang (2009) showed in a study of noncompliant behavior among
Chinese apparel and textile suppliers that the buyer’s governance mechanism impacts supplier
compliance with Supplier Codes of Conduct. When buyers used more cooperation and
collaboration in the relationship, as opposed to threat and coercion, the result was more
sustainable compliance. Even the FDA is taking a more collaborative approach and stressing
education and training in its practices with foreign countries. Included in FDA’s budgets for
fiscal year 2010 were specific items designed to improve product quality and safety in the
medical device industry. For example, it proposed to provide onsite training to foreign
regulators on medical device safety and quality. Also, it proposed to develop computerized
training classes on safety and quality standards and to translate them into several languages
(Department of HHS FDA, 2009). Another stream of research addresses how to assure supplier
relationships that promote and provide incentives for safety with suppliers, including the
implementation of cost-sharing contracts for recalls (Chao et al., 2009). In summary, the topic
of the role and nature of supplier relationships in a product safety risk strategy is in need of
additional research. The current literature indicates that research addressing strategies for risk
prevention, risk mitigation and risk control will complement existing work in the area of
procurement and supply management.
5. Conclusions
This article highlights the many timely and important problems arising in the area of product
safety and security that can benefit from an operations management perspective. Although
there is a growing literature in the interfaces among and between risk management, quality
management and supply chain management, there has been relatively little scholarly work
that has addressed the product safety and security challenges that arise in these interfaces.
Our review identifies primary safety challenges that arise in five highly regulated industries:
food, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, consumer products and automotive. With regard to
similarities, we note that each of these industries is rapidly globalizing. For each, the supply
chain is becoming longer and more complex. Further, while the outsourcing of manufacturing
capacity to low-cost countries is on the rise, increasingly design capacity is being outsourced
as well. A major conclusion is that in each of these industries, a pressing safety or security
problem can be traced back to conditions in the global supply chain. Thus, in the food industry
a major problem is contamination, while in pharmaceuticals, it is counterfeiting. The medical
device industry is coping with ensuring safety given the rapid pace of technological change.
Designing products for safety is the major problem in the consumer products and automotive
industries.
In our review we identify four key areas for operations management research in addressing
safety and security problems: regulation and standards, product lifecycle management;
traceability and recalls, and supplier management. In each area, we demonstrate how existing
theories and methodologies of operations management can be used to develop better
techniques and solutions for understanding the role supply chain and operations management
can play in addressing the product safety and security problems faced by each industry. We
hope that the topic of product safety and security will continue to be recognized as timely and
relevant to both researchers and practitioners in the area of supply chain management.
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